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FOURTH PRINTING

Attention is drawn to the note made to the original title-page (see page 170 of this volume), which shows that such titles as Two Treatises of Civil Government, or The Second Treatise of Civil Government are solecisms.

MENTOR TRADEMARK FOR P. E. PAT. OFF. AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES
REGISTERED TRADEMARK—MARCA REGISTRADA
ECHO BY CHICAGO, U.S.A.

SIGNET, SIGNET CLASSICS, SIGNETTE, MENTOR AND PLUME BOOKS are published in the United States by
The New American Library, Inc.,
1331 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10019,
in Canada by The New American Library of Canada Limited,
295 King Street East, Toronto 2, Ontario,
in the United Kingdom by The New English Library Limited,
Barnard’s Inn, Holborn, London, E.C. 1, England

FIRST PRINTING, DECEMBER, 1965

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
lawful Conqueror, and a Captive. For, if once Compact
enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited
Power on the one side, and Obedience on the other, the
State of War and Slavery ceases, as long as the Compact
endures. For, as has been said, no Man can, by agree-
ment, pass over to another that which he hath not in him-
self, a Power over his own Life.
10 I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other
Nations, that Men did sell themselves; but, 'tis plain, this
was only to Drudgery, not to Slavery. For, it is evident,
the Person sold was not under an Absolute, Arbitrary,
Despotical Power. For the Master could not have power
15 to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was
obliged to let go free out of his Service: and the Master
of such a Servant was so far from having an Arbitrary
Power over his Life, that he could not, at pleasure, so
much as maim him, but the loss of an Eye, or Tooth,
20 set him free, Exod. XXI.

freeman 'shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slave'
(cx); compare notes on 1, § 130, 6-7, and 1, § 144, 27. The Instructions
to Governor Nicholson of Virginia, which Locke did so much to draft
in 1698 (see Ladell, 1957 [i]), regard negro slaves as justifiably en-
slaved because they were captives taken in a just war, who had forfeited
their lives 'by some Act that deserves Death' (§ 23, 11-12; compare Ty-
rrell, 1681, 62). Locke seems satisfied that the forays of the Royal Africa
Company were just wars of this sort, and that the negroes captured had
committed such acts. The best discussion of Locke on slavery is in
Polin, 1960, 277-81.
16-20 In Exod. xxiii the Mosaic law regulates the treatment of bought
slaves; they are to be freed in the seventh, Jubilee year, not to be
killed, to be freed if maltreated by their masters. Hobbes notices this and
Grotius calls it 'imperfecta servitus,' II, v, 30 (1712, 264).

25 Whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us, that
Men, being once born, have a right to their Preservation,
and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other
things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence; or Revel-
ation, which gives us an account of those Grants God made
of the World to Adam, and to Noah, and his Sons, 'tis
very clear, that God, as King David says, Psal. CXV, xvi,
'has given the Earth to the Children of Men,' given it to
Mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems
to come a very great difficulty, how any one should ever
come to have a Property in anything: I will not content
myself to answer, That if it be difficult to make out
Property, upon a supposition, that God gave the World
to Adam and his Posterior in common; it is impossible
that any Man, but one universal Monarch, should have
15 any Property, upon a supposition, that God gave the
World to Adam, and his Heirs in Succession, exclusive of
all the rest of his Posterior. But I shall endeavour to shew,
how Men might come to have a property in several parts
of that which God gave to Mankind in common, and that
20 without any express Compact of all the Commoners.

125 Chapter V This important chapter is obviously integral to
Locke's argument, and it is also obviously part of his polemic against
Filmer—see note on lines 18-21 below, and on II, § 38, 10-13, etc. There
is nothing to indicate a date of composition in 1699, or at any time
later than the first form of the book, though it was perhaps subsequently
amended, and it will be remembered that it falls within that part of
the 1st edition which could have been modified in the course of print-
ing. Apart from this, there is no reason to doubt that the chapter is to
be dated in 1679.
1-4 This discussion of property is referred to in I, § 77, 15-16, and
I, § 86, 1-5 echoes the language used here. Kendall, 1941, 77, notes the
logical transition from 'men' here, meaning individuals, to 'mankind'
in line 9.
6-9 The biblical evidence for original communism, or rather against
the primacy of private property, is discussed at length in the First
Treatise; see I, § 21 and on: the text from Psalm cxv is cited in I, § 31
as part of a reference to Filmer's case.
9-18 This argument against the supposition that God gave the world
to Adam and his posterity is developed in the First Treatise.
18-21 This sentence confirms that this paragraph, and the whole
chapter on property which follows, were written with Filmer's works in
mind, and as a direct refutation of them. For it was Filmer who has
26. God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience. The Earth, and all that is therein, is given to Men for the Support and benefit of their being. And though all the Fruits it naturally produces, and Beasts it feeds, belong to Mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature; yet every Body has originally a private Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind, in any of them, as they are in their natural state: yet being given for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man. The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Indusury, and is still a Tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his Life.

27. Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.

raised the difficulty that original communism could not give way in private property without the universal consent of mankind. The discussions in Hobbes (the Epistle Dedicatory of De Cive, 1654, in the issue most clearly), Grotius (1625, II. II, 2) and Pufendorf (1672, IV, 3) do not discuss the same as Plinian or Cato's passage which Locke seems to have in mind occurs on p. 273 of Laskett's edition.


The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are property his. Whosoever then he removes 5 out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.

28. He that is nourished by the Acorns he picks up under an Oak, or the Apples he gathered from the Trees and cites many other arguments about property, ignored by Locke; for him the labour proposition is not the one rational method of making use of the earth's produce, but rather a ground for retaining property acquired, and he does not talk of a man owning himself (compare note on II, § 32, 1-8). These points and the known relationship between them (see above, 29-35), may imply that Locke suggested this line of thinking to Tyrell, who followed it without quite realizing what it meant to Locke. It is not impossible that they arrived at this position independently, for in a work published in 1660 but described on the title as 'Mostly written many years past' Richard Baxter writes in a similar term: 'Property is naturally antecedent to Government, which doth not give it, but regulate it to the Common good.' Every man is born with a property in his own members, and nature give him a property in his children, and his food and other just acquisitions of his industry. Therefore no ruler can justly deprive men of their property, unless it be by some Law of God (as in execution of justice on such as forfeit it) or by their own consent, by themselves or their Delegates or Proprietors. And men's lives and Liberties are the chief parts of their property. That is the peoples just reserved Property, and Liberty, which neither God taketh from them, by the power which his own Laws give the Ruler, nor is given away by their own foresaid consent' (Baxter, 1660, 54-5; see Schleifer, 1957, 59, and compare passage from Baxter's Holy Commonwealth, cited by Gough, 1950, 80).

What Baxter says here about life, liberty and property shows that he had the same combined definition of property as Locke, both an extended and a specific definition; see Introduction, 115-16 and note on II, § 57, 5-6. It is possible to find many much vaguer hints at what is too loosely called the labour theory of value (in Petty, 1662, for example, of which Locke had the 1669 printing, or even in Hobbes; see Gough, 1950, 81) but these are the only passages in books he may have read known to me which seem to show a systematic resemblance. See also the hint in I, § 42, 12-17.

28. Repeated in II, § 173, 5-6; cf. Walwyn, the Leveller quoted Macpherson, 1662, 140.

28. 1-4 Compare Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae, 1672, IV, 14, 13, 'Ubi certus est nullius: quod decedenter glandes ejus siebant, qui legisset', and others erat nullius: quod decedenter glandes ejus siebant, qui legisset.'
in the Wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself.
No Body can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then,
5 When did they begin to be his? When he digested? Or
When he eat? Or when he boiled? Or when he brought
them home? Or when he pickt them up? And 'tis plain,
if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else
could. That labour put a distinction between them and
common. That added something to them more than Na-
ture, the common Mother of all, had done; and so they
became his private right. And will any one say he had
no right to those Acorns or Apples he thus appropriated,
because he had not the consent of all Mankind to make
them his? Was it a Robbery thus to assume to himself
what belonged to all in Common? If such a consent as
that was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding
the Plenty God had given him. We see in Commons, which
remain so by Compact, that 'tis the taking any part of
what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature
leaves it in, which begins the Property; without which the
Common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part,
does not depend on the express consent of all the Com-
moners. Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my
25 Servant has cut; and the Ore I have digg'd in any place
where I have a right to them in common with others,
become my Property, without the assignation or consent of
any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out
of that common state they were in, hath fixed my Property.

Gough, 1950, draws attention to this parallel, and to Blackstone's ac-
count of the clash between Locke on the one hand and both Pufendorf and Grotius on the other in their views on the origin of property. For
in spite of the above coincidence about acorns, Pufendorf follows Gro-
tius in assigning the origin of property to universal agreement, not la-
bour. Barbeyrac, in his edition of Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae, registers
his agreement with Locke's views on this matter, and maintains that
Locke was the first to formulate it, earlier than the only other author
he quotes, C. G. Titses of Leipzig (1651-1714). He also notes that
Locke's discussion grew out of his refutation of Filmer: Barbeyrac,
1714, I, 576-7. Barbeyrac corresponded with Locke (see Introduction,
88), and no man in the early eighteenth century was in a generally
better position than he to know about the relationship of his writings
with the natural-law jurists and with the whole tradition of social and
political theory.

18-30 Locke is using here the language of agrarian enclosure, the
parcelling out of the common fields of the traditional manor as private
property, which was so marked a feature of English economic history

29. By making an explicit consent of every Com-

moner, to necessary to 10 any ones appropriating to himself
any part of what is given in common, Children or Servants
could not cut the Meat which their Father or Master had
provided for them in common, without assigning to every
one his peculiar part. Though the Water running in the
Fountain be every ones, yet who can doubt, but that in
the Pitcher is his only who drew it out! His labour hath
taken it out of the hands of Nature, where it was common,
and belong'd equally to all her Children, and hath thereby 30
appropriated it to himself.

30. Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that
Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be his goods
who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before, it
was the common right of every one. And amongst those
who are counted the Civiliz'd part of Mankind, who have 5
made and multiplied positive Laws to determine Property,
this original Law of Nature for the beginning of Property,
in what was before common, still takes place; and by ver-
tue thereof, what Fish any one catches in the Ocean, that
great and still remaining Common of Mankind; or what 10
Ambergrie, any one takes up here, is by the Labour that
removes it out of that common state Nature left it in,
made his Property who takes that pains about it. And
even amongst the Hare that any one is Hunting, is
thought his who pursues her during the Chase. For being
15 a Beast that is still looked upon as common, and no Man's private
Possession; whoever has employ'd so much labour
about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has
thereby removed her from the state of Nature, wherein
she was common, and hath begun a Property.
31. It will perhaps be objected to this, That if gathering the Acorns, or other Fruits of the Earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingress as much as he will, To which I answer, Not so. The same Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also bound that Property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 17, is the Voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy, as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty of natural Provisions there was a long time in the World, and the few spenders, and how small a part of that provision the industry of one Man could extend it self, and ingress it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason of what might serve for his use: there could be then little room for Quarrels or Contentions about Property so establish'd.

32. But the chief matter of Property being now not the Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth itself as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest: I think it is plain, that Property in that too is acquired as the former. As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property. He by his Labour does as it were, inclose it from the Common. Nor will it invalidate his right to say, Every body else has an equal Title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the Consent of all his Fellow-Commoners, all Mankind. God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penuity of his Condition required it of him. God and his Reason commanded him to subdue the Earth, i.e.

33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself. For he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No Body could think himself injur'd by the drinking of another River of the same Water left him to quench his thirst. And it is perfectly the same.

34. God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or Covetousness of the Quarrelsome and Contentious. He that had so good left for his Improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's Labour: If he did, 'tis plain he desired the benefit of another's Pains, which he had no right to, and not the Ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than 15 he knew what to do with, or his Industry could reach to.

35. 'Tis true, in Land that is common in England, or any other Country, where there is Plenty of People under

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36 Here Locke seems to recognize the inappropriateness of agrarian enclosure to his argument (see note on II, § 28, 18-30), but he persists. His statements are accurate, but vague, and it is interesting that the words 'Country' and 'Parish' are used where 'Manor' might be expected (line 9).
Government, who have Money and Commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the consent of all his Fellow-Commoners: Because this is left common by Compact, i.e. by the Law of the Land, which is not to be violated. And though it be Common, in respect of some Men, it is not so to all Mankind; but is the joint property of this Country, or this Parish. Besides, the remainder, after such inclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the Commoners as the whole was, when they could all make use of the whole: whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great Common of the World, it was quite otherwise. The Law Man was under, was rather for appropriating. God Commanded, and his Wants forced him to labour. That was his Property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the Earth, and having Dominion we see are joined together. The one gave Title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave Authority so far to appropriate. And the Condition of Humane Life, which requires Labour and Materials to work on, necessarily introduces private Possessions.

36. The measure of Property. Nature has well set, by the Extent of Mens Labour, and the Conveniency of Life: No Mans Labour could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any Man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his Neighbour, who would still have room, for as good, and as large a Possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. This measure did confine every Man's Possession, to a very moderate Proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without Injury to any Body in the first Ages of the World, when Men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their Company, in the then vast Wilderness of the Earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still, without prejudice to any Body, as full as the World seems. For supposing a Man, or Family, in the state they were, at first peopling of the World by the Children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some in-land, vacant places of America, we shall find that the Possessions he could make himself upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of Mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this Man's Incuragement, though the Race 25 of Men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the World, and do infinitely exceed the small number [which] was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of Ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain it self, a Man may be permitted to plough, sow, and reap, without being disturbed, upon Land he has no other Title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary, the Inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his Industry on neglected, and consequently waste Land, has increased the stock of Corn, 36 which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on; This I dare boldly affirm, That the same Rule of Property, (viz.) that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the World, without straining any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice double the Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Man to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them; which, how it has done, I shall, by and by, shew more at large.

37. This is certain, That in the beginning, before the desire of having more than Men needed, had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their nature. The Everyman text, having misnumbered its paragraphs since II. § 20, starts a new paragraph (§ 36) after 'plant in', omitting the

9 "property" altered by Locke from "propriety" in 1698; compare title to chapter VII of the First Treatise.

§ 36 9-28 The smallness of men's possessions in early Biblical times is noted on in I, § 136, 9-12. This passage is a direct statement of Locke's assumption that the state of nature in contemporary America can be assimilated to the conditions of patriarchal times; compare note on I, § 1130.

[Continued on the next page]
usefulness to the Life of Man; or [Men] had agreed, that a little piece of yellow Metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of Flesh, or a whole heap of Corn; though Men had a Right to appropriate, by their Labour, each one to himself, as much of the things of Nature, as he could use: Yet this could not be much, nor to the Prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left, to those who would use the same Industry. To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre of Land, of an equal richness, lying waste in common. And therefore he, that incloses Land and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind. For his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common.

20. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one. For I ask whether in the wild woods and uncultivated wast of America left to Nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres will yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life as ten acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire where they are well cultivated?

Before the Appropriation of Land, he who gathered as much of the wild Fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the Beasts as he could; he that so employed his Pains about any of the spontaneous Products of Nature, as any way to alter them, from the state which Nature put them in, by pacing his Labour on them, did thereby acquire a Property in them: But if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use; if the Fruits rotted, or the Venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common Law of Nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his Neighbour's share, for he had no Right, further than his Use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him Conveniences of Life.

38. The same measures governed the Possession of Land too: Whatever he tillt and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar Right; whatever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the Cattle and Product was also his. But if either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the Ground, or the Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much Ground as he could till, and make it his own Land, and yet leave enough to Abel's Sheep to feed on; a few Acres would serve for both their Possessions. But as Families increased, and Industry enlarged their Stocks, their Possessions enlarged with the need of 15 them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built Cities, and then, by consent, they came in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct Territories, and agree on limits between 20 them and their Neighbours, and by Laws within themselves, settled the Properties of those of the same Society. For we see, that in that part of the World which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as low down as Abraham's time, they wandred with their 25 Flocks, and their Herds, which was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a Country where he was a Stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least, a great part of the Land lay in common; that the Inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed Property in any more than they made 30 use of. But when there was not room enough in the same place, for their Herds to feed together, they, by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and intro-

§ 37 4 Men—added by editor.

12-32. Passage added in two parts in the Chris's copy, see Collation, also recalling English agrarian enclosure, or even justifying it: see note on ii. § 28, 18-30. It is taken by Macpherson (1951, 559 and 1962, 212 om.) to have been inserted by Locke to remove the sufficient limitation on the acquisition of property, which obtained before money was introduced.

35-45. Cited by Kendall, 1941, 72, as a conspicuous example of the public right to interfere with the liberty and property of private persons, making against the individualist interpretation of Locke's theory of property; see Introduction, 114.

§ 38 10-13. These four lines are a paraphrase of a quotation by Fishburn from Selden's Mare Clausum; see Lastlett's edition, 63-4. The passage is given in full in 1, § 76 and commented upon; see note there. 23-4. See 1, § 135, 7-8, verbal parallel.
larged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the
same reason Esau went from his Father, and his Brother,
and planted in Mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.

35. And thus, without supposing any private Dominion,
and property in Adam, over all the World, exclusive of all
other: Men, which can no way be proved, nor any ones[

5]

Property be made out from it; but supposing the World
given as it was to the Children of Men in common, we see
how labour could make Men distinct titles to several
parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be
no doubt of Right, no room for quarrel.

40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration
it may appear, that the Property of Labour should be able
to over-balance the Community of Land. For 'tis Labour
indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing; and

5 let any one consider, what the difference is between an
Acre of Land planted with Tobacco, or Sugar, sown with
Wheat or Barley; and an Acre of the same Land lying in
common without any Husbandry do upon it, and he will find,
that the improvement of Labour makes the far greater part
of the value. I think it will be but a very modest Computation
to say, that of the Products of the Earth useful to the
Life of Man ¾10 are the effects of labour: nay, if we will
rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up
the several Expenses about them, what in them is purely
owing to Nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that
in most of them ¾10 are wholly to be put on the account
of labour.

41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any
thing, than several Nations of the Americans are of this
who are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life:
whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other
5 people, with the materials of Plenty, i.e. a fruitful Soil, as
to produce in abundance, what might serve for food,
and delight; yet for want of improving it by

35–6 See I, § 117, 5–6. It is obvious from these parallels that
the paragraph was written with Filmer's argument and Filmer's text
mind. Locke is sketching his account of the passage from a state of
nature to a state of society in terms of biblical history.

§ 39 Also clearly directed against Filmer; its argument occupies a
great deal of the First Treatise, which was why it would have been referred
to here if it had been written at the time.

labour, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences
we enjoy: And a King of a large fruitful Territory there
feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in 10
England.

42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace
some of the ordinary provisions of Life, through their
several progresses, before they come to our use, and see
how much they receive of their value from Human
Industry. Bread, Wine and Cloths, are things of daily use,
and great plenty, yet notwithstanding, Acorns, Water, and

5 Leaves, or Skins, must be our Bread, Drink and Clothing,
did not labour furnish us with these more useful Com-
modities. For whatever Bread is more worth than Acorns,
Wine than Water, and Cloth or Silk than Leaves, Skins, 10
Moss, that is wholly owing to labour and Industry.
The one of these being the Food and Rayment which
un assists Nature furnishes us with; the other provisions
which our Industry and pains prepare for us, which how

15 much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath
computed, he will still see, how much labour makes the far
greatest part of the value of things, we enjoy in this World:
And the ground which produces the materials, is scarce
to be reckond in, as any, or at most, but a very small, part
of it: So little, that even amongst us, Land that is left 20
wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage,
Tillage, or Planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we
shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than
nothing. This shows, how many numbers of men are to be
preferred to largeness of dominions, and that the increase of 25
lands and the right employing of them is the great art of

§ 42 20–4 A further reference to open-field tillage in England; see
II, § 28, 18–30, note and references. The 'waste' (waste) of line 22 was
the meadow land outside the fields, often a grazing area of some value,
1600's (probably after 1689) and belonging therefore to the period of
Locke's activities at the Board of Trade—see Laskett, 1957 (1). It is
very significant of his attitude to that institution and his policy for it,
and for King William III's government in its struggle with France.
24–32 A marginal addition in the Christ's copy, dating from the later
particularly the insistence on increased population (compare I, § 33,
15–30 and note) as against territory as a source of power, and the
and Locke's implied criticism of the system is once more a little out of
the context, though it is interesting that he should have
made it.

Princes (compare II, § 166, 1), reveals the sense in which
Locke, the enemy of divine-kingship, accepted the metaphor of
divinity for the ruler as he thought of him.
government. And that Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of Mankind against the oppression of power and narrowness of Party will quickly be too hard for his neighbours. But this bye the bye. To return to the argument in hand.

43. An Acre of Land that bears here Twenty Bushels of Wheat, and another in America, which, with the same Husbandry, would do the like, are without doubt, of the same natural, intrinsic Value. But yet the Benefit Man kind receives from the one, in a Year, is worth 5 l. and from the other possibly not worth a Penny, if all the Profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may truly say, not ½. 'Tis Labour then which puts the greatest part of Value upon Land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: 'tis to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful Products; for all that the Straw, Bran, Bread, of that Acre of Wheat, is more worth than the Product of an Acre of so good Land, which lies wast, is all the Effect of Labour. For 'tis not bare the Ploughman's Plows, the Reaper's and Thresher's Toll, and the Bakers Sweat, is to be counted into the Bread we eat; the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, who digged and wrought the Iron and Stones, who felled and framed the Timber employed about the Plough, Mill, Oven, or any other Utensils, which are a vast Number, requisite to this Corn, from its being seed to be sown to its being made Bread, must all be charged on the account of Labour, and received as an effect of that: Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in themselves. 'Twould be a strange Catalogue of things, that Industry provided and made use of, above every Loaf of Bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; Iron, Wood, Leather, Bark, Timber, Stone, Bricks, Coals, Lime, Cloth, Dying-Druks, Pitch.

44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, yet Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property, and that which made up the great part of what he applied to the Support or Comfort of his being, when Invention and Arts had improved the conveniencies of Life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

45. Thus Labour, in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property, where-ever any one was pleased to employ it, upon what was common, which remained, a long while, the far greater part, and is yet more than Mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what un-assisted Nature Offered to their Necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the World, (where the Increase of People and Stock, with the Use of Money) had made Land scarce, and so of some Value, the several Communities settled the Bounds of their distinct Territories; and by Laws within themselves, regulated the Properties of the private Men of their Society, and so, by Compact and Agreement, settled the Property which Labour and Industry began; and the Leagues that have been made between several States and Kingdoms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all Claim and Right to the Land in the others Possession, have, by common Consent, given up their Pretences to their natural common Right, which originally they had to those Countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a Property amongst themselves, in distinct Parts and parcels of the Earth: yet there are still great Tracts of Ground to be found, which (the Inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common Money) lie waste, and are more than the People, who dwell on it, do, or can 25 make use of, and so still lie in common. Tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented to the use of Money.

§ 46. Beginning of the argument promised in II. § 36, 44-5, continued until § 51; compare II. § 104.

22-4. It is all mankind, not a particular collection or society, which consents to the use of money, that is precious metals. Locke had stated this in his first writing on money (see note on § 46, 6-8), but this fact is used somewhat obscurely in this paragraph to relate the origin of the property of individuals in objects and the land with the ownership of areas of the earth by nations or states. It was traditional to consider these two forms of ownership side by side, for example, in Grotius and Huttenдорf.
46. The greatest part of things really useful to the Life of Man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first Commons of the World look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves: Gold, Silver, and Diamonds, are things, that Fancy or Agreement hath put the Value on, more then real Use, and the necessary Support of Life. Now of some good things which Nature hath provided in common for man to use, and extend to, alter from the State Nature had put it in, was his. He that gathered a Hundred Bushels of Acorns or Apples, had thereby a Property in them; they were his Goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled: else he took more then his share, and robb'd others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, that it perished not uselessly in his Possession, these he also made use of, and if he also bartered away Plumbs that he might have rotted in a Week, for Nuts that would last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wist not the common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others, as long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again, if he would give us Nuts for a piece of Metal, pleased with its colour, or exchanged his Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or a Diamond, and keep those by him all his Life, he invaded not the Right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just Property not lying in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it.

§ 46 6-8 Compare Locke's Considerations of Interest and Money, written about 1668, published in 1692 (see Introduction, 41 and note). 'For mankind, having consented to put an imaginary value upon gold and silver, by reason of their durableness, and not being very liable to be counterfeited, have made them, by general consent, very liable to be taken as typical of commodities; it is universal consent, world-wide, for foreigners the common pledge.' It is universal consent, world-wide, for foreigners are referred to. (Works, 1801, v, 22). There is some resemblance between Locke's account of the origin and functions of money and the of Matthew Wren, Monarchy Asserted, 1660 (Appendix B, no. 50)—see § 22 on.

47. And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life.

48. And as different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions, so this Invention of Money gave them the opportunity to continue to enlarge them. For supposing an Island, separated from all possible Commerce with the rest of the World, wherein there were but a hundred Families, but there were Sheep, Horses and Cows, with other useful Animals, wholesome Fruits, and Land enough for Corn for a hundred thousand times as much, but nothing in the Island, either because of its Commonness, or Perishableness, fit to supply the 10 place of Money: What reason could any one have there to enlarge his Possessions beyond the use of his Family, and a plentiful supply to its Consumption, either in what their own Industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful Commodities, with others? Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there Men will not be apt to enlarge their Possessions of Land, were it never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent Land, ready cultivated, and still stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product? It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild Common of Nature, whatever was more than would supply the Conveniences of Life to be had there for him and his Family.

49. Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as Money was anywhere known. Find out something that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin presently to enlarge his Possessions.

50. But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the

§ 47 Compare Considerations: 'Money has a value, as it is capable, by exchange, to procure us the necessary conveniences of life, and in this it has the nature of a commodity' (1801, 5, 34).
